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Abstract: From a modern perspective cosmology is a historical science in so far 
that it deals with the development of the universe since its origin some 14 
billion years ago. The origin itself may not be subject to scientific analysis and 
explanation. Nonetheless, there are theories that claim to explain the ultimate 
origin or “creation” of the universe. As shown by the history of cosmological 
thought, the very concept of “origin” is problematic and can be understood in 
different ways. While it is normally understood as a temporal concept, cosmic 
origin is not temporal by necessity. The universe can be assigned an origin 
even though it has no definite age. In order to clarify the question a view of 
earlier ideas will be helpful, these ideas coming not only from astronomy but 
also from philosophy and theology. 
 
1. Introduction: concepts of origin 
In a lecture of 1993 the famous British astrophysicist and cosmologist, Fred Hoyle, 
recommended that “Whenever the word ‘origin’ is used, disbelieve everything you 
are told.” He added, “The biggest pig in a poke where origins are concerned is that of 
the whole universe.”1 Whatever the opinion of Hoyle the concept of origin is 
generally difficult and often tricky, for other reasons because the term is used in 
different contexts and with different meanings. According to the Oxford English 
Dictionary, origin means “the act or fact of beginning, or of springing from 
something; beginning of existence with reference to source or cause; rise or first 
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manifestation.”2 Several other, more or less synonymous words are in use, such as 
start, genesis (or generation), birth, dawning, emergence, and creation. However, in 
reality the words cover a wide spectrum of meanings and are thus not proper 
synonyms. 
 Typically, when we ask “what is the origin of X” we inquire about how X was 
once formed or came into being. A satisfactory answer is supposed to relate to certain 
states of the past from which X emerged. When we say that a person’s country of 
origin is Algeria we mean that he or she was born and raised in Algeria. As a more 
relevant example, consider the origin of the Earth, a question which for long was a 
puzzle to geologists and astronomers but is now well (if not completely) understood. 
According to the consensus theory the Earth was formed approximately 4.5 billion 
years ago from gravitationally caused accretion of matter particles in the solar 
nebula. If this theory turns out to be correct we will have scientifically valid 
knowledge concerning the origin of the Earth. In some cases the origin of X is 
something which happened almost momentarily but in other cases it is a slow and 
gradual process to which no definite time in the past can be assigned. Given that the 
Earth’s crust solidified 4.54  0.05 billion years ago, the origin of the Earth took place 
quickly, at least on a geological time scale.  
 The case of the origin of the biological species, as first fully addressed in 
Charles Darwin’s famous The Origin of Species from 1859, is in this regard quite 
different. Zoologists can explain how and approximately when the mammoth 
evolved from earlier elephants, but in this and some other cases origin means 
essentially evolution. Indeed, to account for the origin of X often means to come up 
with a history of how X developed from ancestral forms. The two cases have in 
common that there was a time when X did not exist. For 6 billion years ago there was 
no Earth, and for 10 million years ago there were no mammoths. We will not 
normally wonder about the origin of something which has always existed and to 
which a first instance cannot be ascribed (but see Section 2). Likewise, we will not 
normally wonder about the origin of something which has never existed – we may be 
interested in the origin of the belief in unicorns but not in the origin of unicorns. 
 In many cases X refers to an object or a class of objects, but it may also be a 
phenomenon. What is the origin of the enigmatic colours of the aurora borealis? In 
this case scientists will point to mechanisms in the atoms in the upper strata of the 
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atmosphere, at a height of approximately 100 km, which are responsible for the 
wavelengths identified in the spectrum of the aurora. Similarly, to explain the origin 
of the present phenomenon of global warming they will examine models of how 
solar heat behaves in an atmosphere containing carbon dioxide and other greenhouse 
gases. In none of these cases does the concept of origin have a direct temporal 
meaning as it primarily relates to a causal mechanism. Nonetheless, since the 
phenomena are effects of certain causes, and causes always precede the effects, there 
is implicitly a temporal link. 
 When we consider the so-called origin of the universe, things become much 
more difficult. In the mentioned examples the origin of X is taken to refer to either an 
ancestral state or something from which the existence of X can be derived either 
causally or in some other way. Consider a radioactive decay where a certain atom Y 
transmutes into another atom X; since the X atom did not exist before the decay we 
may say that it was created. The decay process is governed by the probabilistic laws 
of quantum mechanics which means that no cause can be given why X was created at 
a definite time. Nevertheless, although a sufficient cause cannot be given, the decay 
depends on necessary causes. For example, if there were no atoms of type Y the 
creation of X would not happen. It depends on a prior state, which distinguishes it 
from the case of the creation or origin of the big bang universe. 
 In most cases it makes sense to say that Y was the cause of X; by specifying Y 
we can account for the origin of X but only by making the perhaps obvious 
assumption that Y and X are parts of the universe. Given the standard definition of 
the universe we cannot speak in the same manner if X = universe. It is of crucial 
importance to be aware that the two statements “the Earth is 4.5 billion years ago” 
and “the universe is 13.7 billion years ago” are entirely different. If the universe has 
an absolute origin it presumably means that it came into being as a result of 
something either before or outside the universe. None of the options seem to make 
much sense from a scientific point of view and perhaps not even from a logical point 
of view. Sometimes the question of the origin of life is considered to be of a status 
similar to the one of the origin of the universe. But this is a mistake, I think. Although 
we do not know the answer to the first question it can presumably be answered in 
the traditional way, that is, to find out when and how primitive life forms first 
evolved from complex organic but abiotic molecules.  
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 To discuss the question of the origin of the universe in either an evolutionary or 
an absolute version I shall adopt a historical approach.3 Despite the enormous 
progress cosmology has made during the last century the origin problem has not 
come substantially closer to a solution. From a philosophical rather than scientific 
perspective it was much discussed during the previous centuries, and some of the 
arguments entering the discussions are still worth to recall. Precisely because they 
were not limited to a modern scientific perspective they sometimes included 
viewpoints concerning the origin of the universe of conceptual originality and 
interest. 
2. Ancient and medieval periods 
The question of the origin of the universe has not always constituted a significant 
part of cosmological thought. Although there have been periods in which it was 
considered important, such as is obviously the case today, through most of history 
the question failed to attract much attention or was even considered outside the 
scientific study of the cosmos. Yet the very earliest concerns with the heavens were in 
the form of cosmogonies rather than cosmologies, meaning that they were attempts to 
understand how the present world or universe had come into existence. According to 
the cosmogonies of the ancient Egyptian and Mesopotamian civilizations, the 
universe was created as a dynamic entity which gave rise to everything existing, 
including humans and gods.4 The stories that the learned ancients told about the 
origin and evolution of the universe were not scientific but mythological. Because of 
the crucial role played by the gods the stories were theogonies as much as they were 
cosmogonies. The two genres were indistinguishable.   
 A common feature to be found in both of the great river cultures was the belief 
that the creative process started with an undifferentiated watery chaos which the 
gods subsequently separated into two or more separate realms, thereby creating 
Earth and the heaven as distinct bodies. The original state of darkness and lifeless 
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uniformity was posited but not explained. In any case, the primary concern of the 
early cosmogonies was not to describe the universe but to account for the existence of 
its inhabitants in the form of gods, humans and everything else. This is the kind of 
story we meet in the Mesopotamian creation myth Enuma Elish, dating from about 
1500 BC, and also in the much later Theogony written by the Greek poet Hesiod. A 
different variant of the creation theme appears in the Jewish cosmogony as described 
in the very beginning of Genesis:  
In the beginning, when God created the universe, the Earth was formless and desolate. 
“Let there be light – and light appeared.” … Then He separated the light from the 
darkness … Then God commanded, “Let the water below the sky come together in one 
place, so that the land will appear” – and it was done. He named the land “Earth” and 
the water which had come together he named “Sea.” 
The crucial novelty, apart from the introduction of a single almighty and non-created 
God, is the absence of a primordial state. So, from what did God create the universe? 
The text does not say that he created it out of nothingness, but in later Christianity it 
became a dogma that this is what happened. First there was nothing and then, 
because God wanted it, there was something. Creatio ex nihilo.5 As early as the fifth 
century AD the church father St. Augustine pointed out that God’s creation of the 
world included time itself. “The world was made, not in time, but simultaneously 
with time,” he wrote.6 There was no time before the universe. 
 With the rise of Greek natural philosophy and its gradual transformation 
into science, astronomy emerged as a mathematical discipline focused on 
observations of the planetary system; on the other hand, speculations about the 
origin of the world declined drastically.7 In the long period between Plato and 
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Ptolemy cosmogony, in the strict meaning of the term, practically came to a halt. 
However, questions concerning the origin of the world and its subsequent evolution 
continued being addressed by natural philosophers outside the mainstream 
Aristotelian tradition. One of them was the Roman poet Titus Lucretius Carus, an 
advocate of the much earlier atomistic philosophy going back to Democritus and 
Epicurus.  
 In a famous text composed about 50 BC called De Rerum Natura (On the 
Nature of Things), Lucretius described the atomists’ infinite universe solely made up 
of atoms in incessant motion. This universe was of finite age and “there will be an 
end to the heaven and the Earth.”8 Rather than basing his argument on some 
mythological scenario Lucretius called attention to the shortness of human history. 
Apparently unable to conceive a world without humans (or without poets), he asked: 
“If there was no origin of the heavens and Earth from generation, and if they existed 
from all eternity, how is it that other poets, before the time of the Theban war, and 
the destruction of Troy, have not also sung of other exploits of the inhabitants of 
Earth?” Lucretius suggested that “the whole of the world is of comparatively modern 
date, and recent in its origin.” He and a few other philosophers of the atomistic and 
Stoic schools argued that “The walls of the great world, being assailed around, shall 
suffer decay, and fall into mouldering ruins.” From this they concluded that the 
world cannot be eternal in the past but must have had a beginning in time.9  
 The philosophical cosmology of Lucretius, including its associated 
cosmogony, differed completely from the far more influential ideas of Aristotle 
expounded in his De Caelo (On the Heavens) and other works. Aristotle’s cosmos was 
in a steady state in so far that it was eternal, and local non-circular changes were 
restricted to the sublunary world. He argued that the universe as a whole, apart from 
being unique (no other universes), was spatially finite but temporally infinite in both 
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directions. In other words, it was eternal and hence uncreated as well as 
indestructible.  
 Suppose, Aristotle said in De Caelo, that the world was formed out of some 
pre-existing and unchanging elements. “Then if their condition was always so … the 
world could never have come into being. And if the world did come into being, then, 
clearly, their condition must have been capable of change and not eternal.”10 He 
further referred to what in cosmological thought is known as the “why not sooner?” 
argument, namely: If the universe came into being a finite time ago, what reason 
could there possibly be for just this time rather than some other time? In the words of 
Aristotle: “Why, after an infinity of not being, was it generated, at one moment rather 
than another? If there is no reason and the moments are infinite in number, it is clear 
that a generated or destructible thing existed for an infinite time.” Augustine would 
later counter that the universe could not possibly have come into existence at an 
earlier time since there was no time before the universe began.11 Aristotle 
summarized his position as follows: “The heaven as a whole neither came into being 
nor admits of destruction, … but is one and eternal, with no end or beginning.” 
Aristotle’s assumptions about a finite and eternal cosmos were not generally 
accepted in the Greek-Roman culture, but later they came to dominate the medieval 
world view. There was one exception though, namely the controversial and most un-
Christian claim of the universe being past eternal.  
 The Christian universe was divinely created out of nothing and hence of 
finite age, in sharp contradiction to what Aristotle had taught. As early as the sixth 
century the Christian philosopher Johannes Philoponus developed a series of rational 
arguments based on the concept of infinity against Aristotle’s heresy. Let us assume, 
Philoponus said, that the world had always existed and been populated with 
humans. In that case, there would have existed an infinity of humans up to the time 
of Socrates. But, he went on, “there will have to be added to it the individuals who 
came into existence between Socrates and the present, so there will be something 
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greater than infinity, which is impossible.”12 Another variant of his argument related 
to the periods of revolution of the planets and stars. If Saturn had revolved infinitely 
many times, Jupiter would have performed three times as many revolutions and the 
stars many more times as many. This he thought was not only incredible but strictly 
impossible. “Thus necessarily the revolution of the heavenly bodies [and hence the 
universe itself] must have a beginning.” 
 Much later, when Aristotle’s philosophical system had been rediscovered 
and to a large part incorporated in the medieval-Christian world view, the problem 
of cosmic origin remained controversial. It caused the great theologian Thomas of 
Aquinas to re-examine the idea of creation. Could God have created an eternal 
universe? Creation and eternity may appear to be mutually exclusive concepts, but 
Aquinas pointed out that since God is a non-temporal being he did not need to 
precede his effects in time. God did not transform “nothing” into something, he 
causes things to exist continually in the sense that if they were left to themselves they 
would return to nothingness. Aquinas distinguished between a temporal beginning 
of the universe and its creation, where the latter concept refers to the existence of the 
universe as such. From this point of view an eternal yet created universe was 
perfectly possible. Even if the universe had no temporal beginning, it would still 
depend upon God’s power for its very being.13 Creation, Aquinas argued in De 
Aeternitatis Mundi from about 1270, had a double meaning: 
The first is that it presupposes nothing in the thing which is said to be created. … The 
second thing is that non-being is prior to being in the thing which is said to be created. 
This is not a priority in time or of duration, such as that what did not exist before does 
exist later, but a priority of nature, so that, if the created thing is left to itself, it would 
not exist, because it only has a being from the causality of the higher cause. 
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Bonaventure, a contemporary Franciscan theologian, argued against Aquinas that the 
eternity of the world was heretical as well as philosophically absurd; because, had 
the world existed in an eternity the number of revolutions in the heavens must have 
been infinite, and for this reason the present could never have been reached. But it 
was Aquinas and not Bonaventure who won the discussion. Continual but timeless 
creation was eventually adopted by the Catholic Church under the name creatio 
continua (as opposed to creatio originans). 
3. From Kant to Einstein 
During the scientific revolution, roughly the 150-year period between Copernicus 
and Newton, astronomy was established as a branch of mechanical physics. 
Telescopic observations greatly expanded the astronomers’ horizon, but the progress 
was basically limited to the solar system. Generally, cosmology played very little role 
and cosmogony even less. The question of the origin of the world was largely a non-
question in the sense that everyone agreed that of course the world was divinely 
created. Characteristically, when the great astronomers of the period addressed the 
issue of the time of creation – and many of them did – they looked to biblical 
chronology rather than trying to answer the question by scientific means. Johannes 
Kepler found in this way that God had created the universe 3983 BC; the Danish 
astronomer Longomontanus, a pupil of Tycho Brahe, arrived at 3967 BC.  
 Whereas the date of creation could only be inferred from the Bible, a finite-
age universe could be argued without it. If the cosmos were a machine slowly 
running down, such as Newton came to believe, it could not have existed forever, for 
in that case it would already be in a state of total dissolution (which it is not). As the 
British astronomer James Ferguson expressed it in a book of 1757, “For, had it existed 
from eternity, and been left by the Deity to be governed by the combined actions of 
the above [Newtonian] forces or powers, generally called Laws, it had been at an end 
long ago.”14 It was neither the first nor the last time that a counterfactual argument of 
this kind was used as evidence for a universe of finite age. As mentioned, it can be 
found much earlier in Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura and other of the sources of ancient 
natural philosophy. 
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 The traditional view was that God had created the universe more or less as it 
still is, but during the era of the Enlightenment this view was challenged by a series 
of evolutionary cosmogonies. According to these scenarios, the world as presently 
observed was the outcome of a slow evolutionary process starting in a very different 
state, perhaps a primordial chaos of the kind that the ancient atomists had assumed. 
The most innovative and elaborated version of the evolutionary cosmogonies was 
published in 1755 by 31-year-old Immanuel Kant as Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und 
Theorie des Himmels (Universal History and Theory of the Heavens). Kant started with 
a primeval, divinely created chaos of particles and then, ostensibly relying on the 
principles of Newtonian mechanics, explained how the chaotic state naturally 
evolved into condensations out of which the solar system and indeed the whole 
ordered universe was formed. What matters in the present context is that Kant’s 
cosmic creation was an evolutionary process allegedly governed by the laws of 
physics and thus quite different from creation once and for all. “Creation is not the 
work of a moment,” he emphasized. “Creation is never completed. Though it has 
once started, it will never cease. It is always busy in bringing forth more scenes of 
nature, new things and new worlds.”15 
 While young Kant optimistically believed that the universe as a whole would 
be subject to scientific analysis, apparently he changed his mind. In his far better 
known and more influential Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Critique of Pure Reason) of 
1781 he concluded that the notions of age and extent were meaningless when applied 
to the universe. In his so-called first antimony he first proved by means of logical 
arguments that “The world has a beginning in time, and is limited also with regard 
to space;” he next proved the opposite, that is, “The world has no beginning and no 
limits in space, but is infinite, in respect both to time and space.”16 Since the concept 
of the world at large was thus contradictory, he concluded that it cannot cover a 
physical reality but only be a concept of heuristic value. It was what he called a 
regulative principle. Kant’s cosmogony of 1755 became the backbone of the later 
nebular hypothesis, also known as the Kant-Laplace hypothesis, which played a very 
important role during the nineteenth century. The role was controversial as well, for 
the hypothesis of a nebular origin of the universe, with no explanation of the original 
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16  Critique of Pure Reason, Chapter II, Section II. 
11 
 
nebular stuff, was sometimes taken to imply an eternal and uncreated universe.17 
Evolution did not square easily with creation. 
 In 1858 the German astronomer Johann Mädler suggested an argument for 
the origin of the universe a finite time ago which relied on observation rather than 
logic. His aim was not so much to provide evidence for a created universe, which he 
took for granted, as it was to explain the so-called Olbers’ paradox of the darkness of 
the sky at night. The name refers to another German astronomer, Heinrich Wilhelm 
Olbers. As had been pointed out as early as the seventeenth century, if the universe 
was infinitely (or just enormously) large and filled uniformly with stars, the 
accumulated starlight should make the sky at night as bright as on a sunny day. And 
yet the night is dark. Mädler’s solution was to combine the finite velocity of light 
with the hypothesis that the stars had not always existed. “If we knew the moment of 
creation, we should be able to calculate its boundary,” he wrote, referring to the stars 
most far away.18 However, his suggestion attracted almost no attention and was only 
revived much later in connection with the expanding universe discovered around 
1930. 
 As mentioned, the question of the origin of the universe was given little 
priority by the astronomers. But it was considered interesting by the philosophers 
who in the spirit of Kant analysed it from a logical and conceptual point of view. One 
of them was Herbert Spencer, a prominent evolutionary philosopher in favour of the 
nebular world view. Spencer distinguished between three assumptions concerning 
the origin of the universe in an absolute sense. We may assert, he wrote in First 
Principles first published in 1862, that the universe is self-existent, or that it is self-
created, or that it is created by an external agency. His analysis of the three 
possibilities led him to a conclusion no less pessimistic than the one Kant had arrived 
at more than eighty years earlier: 
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Thus these three different suppositions respecting the origin of things, verbally 
intelligible though they are, and severally seeming to their respective adherents quite 
rational, turn out, when critically examined, to be literally unthinkable. It is not a 
question of probability, or credibility, but of conceivability. … Impossible as it is to 
think of the actual universe as self-existing, we do but multiply impossibilities of 
thought by every attempt we make to explain its existence.19 
Cosmic creation might be beyond human comprehension, but it did not prevent 
scientifically based arguments for the universe being of finite age. The discovery in 
the 1850s of the second law of thermodynamics implied a tendency of all natural 
processes towards an equilibrium state of uniform temperature. If extrapolated to the 
far future, it indicated that all activity in the universe would come to an end, a state 
known as the “heat death.” If extrapolated to the far past, it indicated that the 
universe had a beginning in time – or rather that there was a beginning for the 
operation of the laws of nature. The argument was often stated in terms of Rudolf 
Clausius’ concept of entropy, a quantity which is a measure of degradation and has 
the unique property that it always increases in a closed system. The “entropic 
creation argument” can be stated counterfactually: if the universe had existed in an 
eternity of time, the entropy must now have reached its maximum; but since there is 
order and structure in the universe, this is obviously not the case; it follows that the 
age of the universe is finite, meaning that it had a beginning.20  
 This kind of argument, often supplied with the apologetic assumption that 
cosmic beginning implied divine creation, was hotly debated from about 1865 to 
1915, but more among philosophers and theologians than among astronomers. It did 
not succeed in making a universe of finite age generally accepted. As late as 1913 the 
eminent British geophysicist Arthur Holmes referred to the entropic creation 
argument as follows:  
If the development of the universe be everywhere towards equalization of temperature 
implied by the laws of thermodynamics, the question arises – why in the abundance of 
time past, has this melancholy state not already overtaken us? Either we must believe 
in a definite beginning, in the creation of a universe furiously ablaze with energy, or 
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else we must assume that the phenomena we have studied simply reflect our limited 
experience.21  
However, Holmes denied the validity of the argument and maintained that the 
universe as a whole had existed eternally and probably evolved through an infinite 
number of cycles.  
 At the time of World War I cosmology did not yet exist as a scientific 
discipline. In so far that astronomers dealt with cosmological questions they focused 
on the structure of the stellar universe, in particular the size of the Milky Way and its 
relation to the nebulae. Were the nebulae parts of the Milky Way system or were they 
huge conglomerates of stars, milky ways in their own right, far away from it?  
 In 1917 Albert Einstein laid the foundation of modern cosmology by 
proposing a model of the universe on the basis of his new theory of gravitation, the 
general theory of relativity.22 Although Einstein’s model was a revolution in 
cosmological thought, its picture of the universe was in some sense traditional. The 
model presupposed that the universe as a whole was uniform and spatially closed 
corresponding to a positive curvature of space; it was finite yet with no boundary 
and therefore contained but a finite number of stars. Importantly, it was also static in 
the sense that the curvature of space and the mean density of matter remained 
constant. To maintain a static universe in accordance with astronomical observations 
Einstein had to introduce a new term in his cosmological field equations, the later so 
famous cosmological constant. Being static his universe had no temporal dimension 
but was eternal in both past and future time. For this reason alone the question of the 
origin of the universe did not enter Einstein’s mind. Nor did it enter the minds of the 
few other physicists and astronomers occupying themselves with his mathematically 
and conceptually abstruse theory. 
4. The big bang hypothesis 
It turned out that Einstein’s cosmological field equations were much richer in 
mathematical structure than he thought at first. The equations do not merely describe 
a static universe of the type Einstein examined in 1917 but also a whole class of 
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dynamical models, that is possible universes with a curvature (and hence size) that 
varies in time. The first to point out these mathematical solutions was the Russian 
physicist Alexander Friedmann, who in a paper of 1922 analysed all uniform models 
described by the field equations. Some of these models were expanding, meaning 
that the size of the universe (as given by the distance measure R) increased in cosmic 
time t. As Friedmann realized, there were models with the remarkable property that 
R = 0 for t = 0 in the past, or what he called a “beginning of the world.” R = 0 
corresponds to a point in space, a “singularity” with no spatial extension at all. 
Friedmann wrote: “The time since the creation of the world is the time which has 
passed from the moment at which space was a point (R = 0) to the present state (R = 
R0).”23  
 Here we have, for the first time, the notion of the origin of the universe 
derived not from a philosophical doctrine but from a fundamental theory of physics. 
On the other hand, Friedmann’s brilliant investigation was primarily a mathematical 
exercise and he did not express any preference for one model over another. He did 
not argue that our universe is in fact expanding or that it really had an origin in a 
singularity. At any rate, for nearly a decade his paper remained either unknown or 
unappreciated. 
 By 1930 the expansion of the universe, now supported by observation as well 
as theory, had become a reality. But the notion of a beginning of the world does not 
follow logically from cosmic expansion. What became known as the big bang 
universe in a realistic sense was first proposed on 9 May 1931 in a brief note in the 
journal Nature. The author was Georges Lemaître, a 36-year-old Belgian 
astrophysicist and cosmologist who was also trained as a Catholic priest.  
 “We could conceive,” Lemaître wrote in his 1931 paper, “the beginning of the 
universe in the form of a unique atom, the atomic weight of which is the total mass of 
the universe … [and which] would divide in smaller and smaller atoms by a kind of 
super-radioactive process.”24 He used the term “atom” in a metaphorical sense close 
to that of the ancient Greeks, namely as something completely undifferentiated and 
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devoid of physical properties. Moreover, he carefully spoke about the beginning or 
origin of the universe, not its creation. As a faithful Catholic Lemaître was convinced 
that God had created the universe, and yet he stressed that its origin was a natural 
event and that his theory was purely scientific. At one occasion he wrote that “the 
hypothesis of the primeval atom is the anti-thesis of the supernatural creation of the 
world.” He elaborated: 
We may speak of this event as of a beginning. I do not say a creation. Physically it is a 
beginning in the sense that if something has happened before, it has no observable 
influence on the behaviour of our universe. … Any pre-existence of our universe has 
a metaphysical character. Physically everything happens as if it was really a 
beginning. The question if it was really a beginning or rather a creation, something 
starting from nothing, is a philosophical question which cannot be settled by physical 
or astronomical considerations.25 
According to Lemaître’s scenario, at t = 0 the universe already existed in the shape of 
what he called a “primeval atom,” a relatively small body of enormous mass density. 
Such a hypothetical super-atom was comprehensible if not subject to scientific 
analysis. Lemaître insisted that it was physically meaningless to speak of time before 
the initial explosion and yet he wrote, inconsistently it seems, “the beginning of the 
world happened a little before the beginning of space and time.” But if time came 
into being only with the original explosion (the big bang), how could the world have 
begun “a little before”? According to Lemaître, immediately after the disintegration 
of the primeval atom it would, at least in principle, be possible to analyse the very 
early universe by means of the laws of physics. Whereas he considered the primeval 
atom to be real, he denied that the cosmic singularity R = 0 formally turning up in the 
equations at t = 0 could be ascribed physical reality. The “annihilation of space,” as 
he called it, was for him a mathematical artefact.  
 Well acquainted with the philosophical classics Lemaître knew about Kant’s 
argument against a cosmic beginning. If the universe started with the explosion of 
the primeval atom, what caused the explosion? Cause precedes the effect, so how can 
there be a causal agent before the beginning when time did not even exist? Lemaître 
admitted that Kant’s objection was a genuine dilemma in so far that the universe is 
governed by the principles of causality and determinism inherent in classical 
                                                 
25  Quoted in H. Kragh, Matter and Spirit in the Universe: Scientific and Religious Preludes to 
Modern Cosmology (London: Imperial College Press, 2004), pp. 147-148. 
16 
 
mechanics. But in quantum mechanics processes can occur without a cause, such as 
is the case in radioactive decay. Lemaître considered the quantum origin of the 
universe to be essential, for only in this way could one avoid the tricky question of 
what caused the initial disintegration. Although his idea was received with interest 
in the popular press, astronomers either ignored or rejected it. A Canadian 
astronomer characterized it as “the wildest speculation of all” and “an example of 
speculation run mad.”26 And yet it was out of this wild speculation that the modern 
theory of the big bang universe emerged. 
 In the late 1940s Lemaître’s daring hypothesis was independently 
transformed into a more detailed and advanced theory of the early universe, now by 
conceiving it in terms of nuclear physics. According to the Russian-American 
physicist George Gamow the very early universe was a hot and dense inferno of 
interacting nuclear particles, and as a result of the interactions the chemical elements 
were formed during a brief period in the cosmic past. Together with his collaborators 
Ralph Alpher and Robert Herman he realized in 1948 that the earliest inferno must 
consist predominantly of high-energy radiation rather than particles such as protons 
and neutrons. On this basis they succeeded in establishing the essential features of 
the “hot big bang” theory as it is known today. With respect to the absolute origin of 
the universe, Gamow intentionally disregarded it. He and his collaborators simply 
started their calculations in a pre-existing original universe, without concerning 
themselves with where it came from (except that Gamow speculated that the big 
bang might be the result of the collapse of a previous universe – a “big crunch”). 
Although his cosmological model was often labelled a creation theory, in reality it 
was an evolution theory. Gamow did use the term “creation,” but merely in the 
innocent sense of “making something shapely out of shapelessness.”27 
 Finite-age models of the type proposed by Lemaître and Gamow were 
challenged by the fundamentally different steady state theory of the universe 
introduced by Fred Hoyle, Hermann Bondi and Thomas Gold in 1948. According to 
this theory the universe had existed in an eternity of time and would continue 
existing eternally. Moreover, its average density of matter remained the same despite 
its continual expansion, which was explained by postulating a tiny amount of matter 
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creation throughout the universe.28 This element of spontaneous matter creation 
aroused heated debate. While some scientists objected that the fundamental law of 
energy conservation could not be violated, philosophers tended to conceive matter 
creation as an example of deus ex machina reasoning. To Mario Bunge, a physicist and 
philosopher, the steady state theory was nothing but “science-fiction cosmology.”29 
Of course, Hoyle and his supporters denied the charges. 
 What matters is that by assuming an infinite age of the universe the steady 
state theorists avoided the thorny question of a beginning. It was in this context that 
Hoyle, on 28 March 1949, gave a BBC broadcast in which he coined the name “big 
bang” for the kind of cosmological theory which assumed an origin of the universe in 
an explosive event. The following year he characterized “the big bang assumption 
[as] an irrational process that cannot be described in scientific terms.”30 What he had 
in mind was the old objection that there can be no causal explanation, indeed no 
explanation of any kind, for the beginning of the universe. At more than one occasion 
he associated the big bang theory with theism, suggesting that a temporal beginning 
of the universe implied divine creation and was therefore unscientific. For example: 
“The passionate frenzy with which the big-bang cosmology is clutched to the 
corporate scientific bosom evidently arises from a deep-rooted attachment to the first 
page of Genesis, religious fundamentalism at its strongest.”31 
 During the period from 1948 to the early 1960s the steady state theory was a 
serious alternative to evolutionary models based on Einstein’s equations, whether 
these were finite-age models or not. However, with the discovery of the cosmic 
microwave background in 1965 the balance tipped decisively to the advantage of the 
big bang. According to this theory, in the very early and hot universe light (or 
photons) would be coupled to elementary particles and unable to escape them. But 
when the universe cooled enough for protons and electrons to form hydrogen atoms 
the universe became transparent – filled with freely moving photons. This 
“background radiation” originating more than 13 billion years ago still exists in the 
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form of very weak microwaves. The existence of a background radiation thus follows 
naturally from the big bang theory and had in fact been predicted on this basis by 
Alpher and Herman as early as 1948. On the other hand, the new phenomenon could 
be accommodated by the steady state theory only by means of arbitrary and highly 
artificial hypotheses.  
 To make a long story short, by the late 1960s the steady state theory was 
practically dead and the big bang alternative accepted by the majority of physicists 
and astronomers. Today a much-refined version of Gamow’s hot big bang cosmology 
has the status of a paradigm. As regards the name “big bang” some leading 
cosmologists have suggested that it is a misnomer. This is not only because it alludes 
to a noisy explosion localized in space but also because the big bang, if taken to be a 
creation event at t = 0, is outside the standard models of physics and cosmology.32 
 Hoyle remained throughout his life a sharp critic of the victorious big bang 
theory. Not only did he find it methodologically objectionable, he also argued that an 
explosive beginning in a very simple object failed to account for the evolution of 
order and structure in the universe. Here is how he phrased his objection in an 
address of 1993, realizing that his opposition to the big bang theory was shared by 
only a small minority of his colleagues: 
Explosions do not usually lead to a well-ordered situation. An explosion in a junk-yard 
does not lead to sundry bits of metal being assembled into useful working machines. 
Yet after expanding for about a billion years something of this nature is supposed to 
have happened to the universe. Galaxies formed that are widely similar over large 
volumes of space. Stars formed. Life originated and evolved. Man arose and began to 
think about it all. How such a structured world came into being remains unexplained.33 
According to modern big bang cosmology there is no basis for Hoyle’s objection. On 
the contrary, structures in the universe follow from the lack of homogeneity that the 
theory predicts for its very early development.  
5. Aspects of modern cosmology 
The big bang standard theory has since its establishment some fifty years ago been 
greatly developed theoretically as well as observationally. The best cosmological 
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measurements combined with the best theoretical model results today in an age of 
the universe of remarkable accuracy, namely 13.799  0.021 billion years. Some of the 
advances relate to the very early universe and even to the ultimate question of its 
origin. Did the universe originate in an extended object of some kind, perhaps a 
modern analogue of Lemaître’s primeval atom, or in a singularity of zero extension? 
If the latter is the case it is tempting to identify the initial singularity with the 
absolute beginning of the universe. Since the singularity has no physical properties 
whatsoever, the question of where it came from need not arise. 
 In work around 1965 Roger Penrose, Stephen Hawking and a few other 
mathematical physicists proved that a universe governed by the general theory of 
relativity must necessarily possess a space-time singularity. Although the proof is 
sometimes taken to imply that the universe started in a singularity, this is too strong 
an interpretation. Almost all cosmological models describe a finitely old universe but 
not, when physics is added to the mathematics, a universe starting in a singularity. 
The Penrose-Hawking singularity theorem builds solely on general relativity and 
thus does not take quantum effects into regard. But it is generally believed that the 
physics of the very early universe can be understood only on the basis of a unified 
theory of gravitation and quantum mechanics.  This era of quantum gravity is 
believed to be the inconceivably small time interval between t = 0 and t = 10-43 sec, 
where the latter is known as the Planck time. As far as physics is concerned, the 
initial singularity is not inevitable. 
 In modern early-universe cosmology the vacuum is a main player. From the 
point of view of quantum mechanics the vacuum is entirely different from the void 
or nothingness of classical physics (or perhaps one should say metaphysics). A 
vacuum is necessarily filled with energy which fluctuates wildly and spontaneously. 
Might the universe have its origin in a quantum fluctuation? This is what the 
American physicist Edward Tryon proposed in 1973, thus giving a new twist to the 
concept of creatio ex nihilo. Although Tryon’s model turned out to be flawed, other 
physicists came up with similar suggestions of “Creation of Universes from 
Nothing,” as the title of a 1982 paper reads.34 The author, the Russian-American 
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physicist Alexander Vilenkin, claimed that his theory explained how “the universe is 
spontaneously created from literally nothing.” However, this and other theories in the 
same tradition do not really explain the creation of the universe ex nihilo since they 
merely push back the creation scenario to a hypothetical vacuum scenario. They 
presuppose a primordial quantum vacuum, which is an object describable by the 
laws of physics and in no way the same as “nothing.” Where did the quantum 
vacuum come from? 
 At the time Vilenkin wrote his paper the picture of the very early universe 
had undergone a revolution in the form of the so-called inflation theory. To put it 
briefly, according to this theory there was an extremely brief phase in the history of 
the very early universe, shortly after the Planck time, in which empty space expanded 
at a stupendous speed. Although the inflation lasted from only 10-36 sec to about 10-33 
sec after t = 0, during this brief interval of time space expanded by a factor of 1030 or 
more. The basic mechanism responsible for the huge expansion is believed to be a 
hypothetical “inflaton field” which can be represented by a quantum version of the 
cosmological constant appearing in Einstein’s equations. This constant has the 
remarkable property that it leads to a negative pressure and an associated vacuum 
energy density (rather than the energy itself) which remains constant. It follows that 
the inflation generates an enormous amount of energy – almost out of nothing. After 
the brief inflationary phase, the much slower normal expansion of the now very hot 
and energy-rich space takes over.  
 It all sounds very exotic, almost incredible, but most cosmologists consider 
the inflation scenario, in one of its many versions, to be convincing because of its 
explanatory and predictive power. They believe that we know what the universe 
looked like just 1035 sec after t = 0. This is most interesting but cynics will argue that it 
does not bring us nearer to answering the question of the ultimate origin. Where did 
the inflaton field come from? 
 The success of the inflation theory drew increased attention to the role of the 
cosmological constant as a measure of the energy density of the vacuum. However, it 
was not studies of the very early universe that confirmed Einstein’s cosmological 
constant but astronomical observations of the present expansion rate. In the late 
1990s it turned out that the universe is accelerating, meaning that it expands at an 
increasing rate as if it is blown up by a self-repulsive “dark energy.” The precise 
nature of this dark energy is still unknown but the consensus view is that it is a 
manifestation of the vacuum energy associated with the cosmological constant. This 
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strange kind of energy actually dominates the present universe, as it makes up 
roughly two-thirds of all energy and matter in the universe and in the future will 
dominate even more. While the discovery of dark energy has great consequences for 
the far future of the universe it is not equally relevant for the very early universe. On 
the other hand, it underlines the importance of the vacuum energy density as a 
fundamental characteristic of our universe. 
 The original inflation theory was soon developed into versions of “eternal 
inflation” primarily by Vilenkin and Andrei Linde, who suggested that in the 
universe as a whole, new inflating regions will be produced more rapidly than non-
inflating regions. Inflation is self-generating, if not in our observed universe then in 
the much bigger and presumably infinite universe at large. According to Linde, “the 
universe is an eternally existing, self-reproducing entity that is divided into many 
mini-universes much larger than our observable portion, and … the laws of low-
energy physics and even the dimensionality of space-time may be different in each of 
these mini-universes.”35  
 Here we have the controversial and much-discussed hypothesis of the so-
called multiverse, the idea that there exists a multitude of other universes each with 
its own vacuum energy density.36 We also have the no less controversial idea that, 
despite the big bang origin of our universe, the universe at large is infinite in its 
temporal extension. According to some proponents of eternal inflation the infinity 
covers the past as well as the future, meaning that there is no proper origin. Other 
proponents argue that although inflation will go on forever in the future, it is 
probably not eternal in the past. In that case a primary big bang is still part of the 
picture.  
 As several modern cosmologists have noted, the classical and by now 
defunct steady state theory of Hoyle and his colleagues can in some respects be seen 
as a precursor of eternal inflation, but only if the latter theory can be extended 
eternally to the past. For those who think that it can, Hoyle’s motivation is still valid. 
In a paper advocating eternal inflation in the past two physicists say about the steady 
                                                 
35  A. Linde, Inflation and Quantum Cosmology (Boston: Academic Press, 1990), p. 29. 
36  The multiverse hypothesis exists in several versions. According to some of them the many 
other universes are causally separate, meaning that they are unobservable even in principle. 
For an account of the multiverse and its history ca. 1990-2010, see H. Kragh, Higher 
Speculations: Grand Theories and Failed revolutions in Physics and Cosmology (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), pp. 291-324. 
22 
 
state theory that it is “appealing because it avoids an initial singularity [and] has no 
beginning in time.”37 
 
6. Did the universe have a beginning? 
Eternal inflation is one way of avoiding what some physicists consider unpalatable, 
namely an absolute origin of the universe, but there are several other ways. One of 
them is to introduce a new measure of time that conjures an infinite past out of the 
finite one. This can be done by replacing the ordinary time parameter t by a new one 
θ which is logarithmically related to t time. On the new concept of time the big bang 
did not occur at t = 0 but at θ = − ∞ (minus infinity), which means that it never began. 
In the words of a French physicist, “the numerical finiteness of the age of the 
universe by no means precludes its conceptual infiniteness.” There is a sense in 
which “the universe is infinitely old and had no definite beginning.”38 In this sense 
the big bang can be approached asymptotically but never reached, somewhat in 
analogy to the concept of zero absolute temperature (see Section 7). Conceptually 
appealing as the idea may seem, most physicists consider it nothing but a formal 
trick. They maintain that there was an original big bang approximately 14 billion 
years ago. 
 In philosophical and mythological contexts the idea of a cyclic or oscillating 
universe can be found in ancient Greek and Indian cosmologies. The general idea is 
that our present universe is the outcome of a previous one and that it will itself result 
in a successor universe; and, moreover, that there is an endless number of these 
earlier and later universes. If so there would be neither a beginning nor an end to the 
universe as a whole. In more or less scientific versions ever-cyclic models attracted 
much interest during the nineteenth century, sometimes in the form of the eternally 
recurrent universe in which the cycles were identical in every detail and every single 
event in history thus endlessly repeats itself. For example, the famous German 
philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche advocated such a world view.39   
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 In the context of relativistic cosmology cyclic models were reconsidered by 
Friedmann in his pioneering paper of 1922. In this context the expansion of the 
universe is followed by a contracting phase which again is followed by an expanding 
phase, and so on. The bounce from contraction to expansion – or from a big crunch to 
a big bang – is supposed to take place smoothly between two non-singular states of 
high but not infinitely high density and temperature. Many models of this kind have 
been proposed but they all suffer from severe difficulties and especially so if they 
suppose an infinite number of earlier universes40. If there can only be a finite number 
of previous cycles the whole idea loses much of its philosophical appeal, for then 
there must be a first cycle and the questions of its origin reappears. The classical 
cyclic universe only makes sense if space is closed and expanding at a decreasing 
rate. With the discovery of the acceleration of space this turned out to be wrong and 
models of this kind were consequently abandoned.  
 Nonetheless, the appeal of an endless universe with no beginning was too 
strong to be given up completely. In a new cyclic model proposed in 2002, Paul 
Steinhardt and Neil Turok developed a cosmology with an eternal sequence of 
identical cycles consisting of expansions and contractions. Contrary to earlier models 
it relied on an open and accelerating universe in agreement with observations and it 
was specifically constructed as an alternative to the inflation scenario. In a popular 
address Steinhardt summarized: “Space and time exist forever. The big bang is not 
the origin of time. Rather, it is a bridge to a pre-existing contracting era. The universe 
undergoes an endless sequence of cycles in which it contracts in a big crunch and re-
emerges in an expanding big bang, with trillions of years of evolution in between.”41 
Although a few physicists continue developing the model, it has failed in making an 
impact on mainstream cosmology. Yet it is worth mentioning as a modern example 
of the enduring appeal of an eternal-cyclic universe in which the question of origin 
does not arise. 
 Finally there is a class of cosmological models which include the hypothesis 
of a pre-big bang universe but are not cyclic in the ordinary sense. One may speak of 
bouncing rather than cyclic models. At about 1950 Gamow speculated that the 
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universe might have evolved from a previous state of nearly infinite rarefaction 
which slowly had contracted gravitationally into a super-dense state; out of this state 
the big bang of our present universe emerged. It was thus a temporally symmetric 
picture of the universe, stretching from minus infinity to plus infinity and with no 
absolute beginning. Modern theories founded on quantum gravity have resulted in 
pictures which, from a qualitative point of view, share the basic features of Gamow’s 
classical picture. 
 The best offer of a theory of quantum gravity may be the fundamental theory 
of superstrings, a unified many-dimensional theory of gravity and the three forces of 
nature which can be understood in terms of quantum mechanics. These are the well-
known electromagnetic force and the two short-range forces known as the weak and 
the strong (or nuclear) interactions. It turns out that the electromagnetic and the 
weak forces can be unified in a single theory and that this “electroweak” theory can 
be extended to cover also the strong force in what is called “grand unified theory.” 
String theory is even grander as it offers a unified formalism encompassing all the 
four interactions. The prefix “super” indicates so-called supersymmetry with the 
implication that all the known elementary particles having partner particles. For 
example, the photon has a supersymmetric partner called a photino. Alas, none of 
these superpartners have been detected in experiments. What is of relevance here is 
that physicists have constructed cosmological models on the basis of string theory 
and that these models avoid the initial singularity and the problem of an absolute 
beginning.  
 According to string cosmology or what is sometimes called pre-big bang 
cosmology, the big bang at t = 0 was not the origin of everything but a moment in 
cosmic time when a state of very high but finite density bounced into a state of 
rapidly decreasing density. Strings are irreducible one-dimensional objects and the 
theory includes a fundamental length which can be thought of as the dimension of a 
point in space; the length is about 10-34 m, which is also the smallest radius of cosmic 
space. The string scenario posits a flat and nearly empty universe in the indefinite 
past and also, symmetrically, in the indefinite future. From the eternally existing pre-
universe our universe emerged when the density reached the maximum value in a 
big crunch, or what from our point of view was a big bang. After that followed an 
inflationary phase and eventually the eternally accelerating universe as we observe it 
today. 
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 Although there is no definite origin of the string universe, one of its leading 
advocates, the Italian physicist Maurizio Gasperini, believes that “the Universe was 
born according to God’s will, with an act of creation having its ultimate and complete 
purpose in human beings.”42 He recognizes that this is of course a personal view and 
not one which can be justified scientifically. There was no origin of the universe, and 
yet it was created. His view brings to mind the old discussion going back to Thomas 
Aquinas of whether or not God could have created an eternal universe. 
 Apart from string theory, “loop quantum gravity” (LQG) is another 
candidate for a unified theory of general relativity and quantum mechanics. LQG is 
entirely different from string theory, for other reasons because it does not include 
supersymmetry and operates with only the four known dimensions of space-time. 
Despite the differences, when applied to the universe at large it results in a picture 
which is surprisingly similar to the one of string cosmology.43 While strings cannot be 
squeezed to zero volume, in LQG space itself is discrete, in a sense made up of 
minimum “space atoms” of a volume of the order of 10-100 m3. For this reason loop 
quantum cosmology reproduces the feature of string cosmology, that there is no big 
bang singularity. The universe pictured by LQG theorists also has no beginning and 
no end. It develops from a past-eternal pre-universe over the bounce at t = 0 to the 
future-eternal present universe. In spite of the similarities between the cosmic 
scenarios offered by the two theories of quantum gravity they result in different 
predictions which can in principle (but perhaps only in principle) be tested by 
measurements. Work in this or other  traditions of quantum cosmology continues to 
this day, suggesting that it is theoretically possible to explain the big bang at t = 0 as 
the result of a previously contracting universe.44 
 It seems that modern theories of quantum gravity are no more able than 
other cosmological theories to come up with a good answer concerning the ultimate 
origin of the universe. Here is the view of Thanu Padmanabhan, an Indian 
cosmologist and specialist in quantum gravity who has also investigated modern 
steady state theories of the universe: 
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How (and why!) was the universe created and what happened before the big bang? 
The cosmologist giving the public lecture usually mumbles something about requiring 
a quantum gravity model to circumvent the classical singularity – but we really have 
no idea! String theory offers no insight; the implications of loop quantum gravity for 
quantum cosmology has attracted fair amount of attention recently but it is fair to say 
that we still do not know how (and why) the universe came into being.45 
Proponents of pre-big bang cosmologies may respond that the universe never came 
into being and thus there is no question to be answered. 
 
7. Philosophical and theological perspectives 
We live in a big bang universe, but unfortunately there is no consensus what the key 
term “big bang” covers. Physicists and astronomers generally refer to the big bang as 
a brief but crucial chapter in the history of the universe, say from t = 10-12 seconds (or 
sometimes 10-35 seconds) to t = 104 seconds. In this sense the big bang can be 
considered a scientific fact supported by a wealth of reliable evidence. But the term is 
also used, especially but not only by philosophers, as a reference to the absolute 
beginning at t = 0. This is quite a different meaning and the concept it covers can in 
no way be characterized as scientifically documented. Creation in an absolute and 
therefore metaphysical sense is not part of what most astronomers and physicists 
refer to as the big bang scenario any more than an absolute origin of life is part of 
what most biologists refer to as the neo-Darwinian evolution scenario. 
 Terminological ambiguities apart, if there were an absolute origin at t = 0, a 
cosmic creation event, can it be explained? The emergence of the first elementary 
particles during the quark era some 10-9 seconds later can be explained from the 
previous state of the universe, but what about the beginning of time itself? As 
mentioned, an ordinary causal explanation based on an earlier state is out of the 
question, at least if we disregard speculations of a multiverse or a pre-big bang 
universe. As an alternative one might consider other forms of explanation not 
ordinarily used in science, such as a teleological explanation where the origin of the 
universe is associated with a purpose; or one may just renounce the possibility of 
understanding the singular event. This event, the creation of the universe, concerns 
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not only the origin of what constitutes the universe – space, time, energy, fields, and 
matter – but also the origin of the laws that govern it. Scientific explanations are 
nomological, meaning that they are based on laws of nature, but how did these laws 
come into being? When cosmologists describe the early universe they make use of 
relativity theory, quantum mechanics, thermodynamics and other theories. Why do 
these laws of nature apply rather than some other laws that one might imagine?  
 It has been suggested that the singular big bang event is not something that 
belongs to the ontology of cosmic evolution but that it can be approached only 
asymptotically. Concepts of this kind are known from other areas of physics which 
may serve as analogies. For example, the absolute zero of temperature (T = 0 K or 
approximately − 273.15 °C) can be approached arbitrarily closely but never be 
reached either in nature or in the laboratory. Like many analogies it serves a heuristic 
purpose only. A decisive difference is that the temperature T = 0 is well defined and 
can be understood in terms of physics. The cosmic t = 0 event, on the other hand, is 
not comprehensible in the same way. It is tempting to consider this event in the light 
of epistemology rather than ontology. In this case the singular big bang is not 
something which once existed but an epistemic horizon, a limit for the intelligibility 
of the cosmos. Science has always been faced with boundaries beyond which it 
seemed powerless but which were nonetheless transgressed by the progress of 
science. These boundaries or horizons move, and there is no reason why the Planck 
time is an absolute horizon of knowledge. Yet it is possible that at least one 
boundary, the one at t = 0, will never be removed.46 
 At the bottom of any discussion of the origin of the universe lies the difficult 
concept of time. Instead of imagining a metaphysical state of nothingness out of 
which the physical universe magically emerged, one may imagine a frozen proto-
universe in which there were no processes at all and hence also no possibility of 
defining time. It may have been something of this kind that Lemaître had in mind 
when he introduced the primeval atom in 1931. However, the imagery seems to be of 
no help and is in any case beyond science. Time is relational. It presupposes an active 
universe with processes that can function as clocks and the clocks of course belong to 
the universe. According to Stephen Hawking, “To ask what happened before the 
universe began is like asking for a point on Earth at 91 north latitude; it just is not 
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defined.”47 Literally speaking the big bang universe has always existed and will exist 
forever irrespective of a future big crunch or not. The terms “always” and “forever” 
are temporal terms meaning at all times and there was no time at which the universe 
did not exist.48 The word “then” is also temporal and for this reason one cannot say 
that “first there was nothing and then there was something.” Although the big bang 
universe has always existed it is not past eternal like the steady state universe. 
 It should be kept in mind that time as used by cosmologists is basically a 
mathematical parameter appearing in the field equations. The time parameter t is 
positive and varies continuously, meaning that it can attain any value however small. 
In principle it can be immensely smaller than the Planck time 10-43 seconds. Why not 
10-1000 seconds? The way that specialists in early-universe cosmology speak about 
time is not only abstract but also in many ways remote from the usual concept where 
time is a measure associated with real physical processes. It is generally believed that 
the cosmic time scale must have a physical basis in the form of a clock and not be just 
a mathematical symbol. The problem is that there are no known processes varying 
with a period so small as the Planck time or the time scale of the inflation era. The 
smallest decay time known from particle physics is about 10-24 seconds, trillions of 
times larger than the Planck time. It is far from clear if the time concept used in this 
branch of cosmology is well defined or is the same concept of time as used elsewhere 
in science.49 And it is even less clear if the physical concept of time can be 
meaningfully extended to the pre-big bang universe hypothesized by some theories 
of quantum gravity. 
 The question of the origin of the universe continues to be of theological 
interest and perhaps even more so than of scientific interest.50 On the face of it the big 
bang theory with its cosmic origin of time seems to offer support for a theistic 
interpretation. After all, if the origin at t = 0 is beyond scientific comprehension and 
the universe is nonetheless of finite age, doesn’t it confirm the view of traditional 
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theism that God, a necessary being, created the universe out of nothing? Although 
the success of the big bang model does not really confirm theism, this is what many 
believers have argued. Notably, in an address of 1951 the pope, Pius XII, endorsed 
the new big bang theory as scientific proof of the biblical creation story.51  
“Everything seems to indicate that the material content of the universe had a mighty 
beginning in time,” the pope asserted. He continued: 
Thus, with that concreteness which is characteristic of physical proofs, it [modern 
science] has confirmed the contingency of the universe and also the well-founded 
deduction as to the epoch when the world came forth from the hands of the Creator. 
Hence, creation took place. We say: therefore, there is a Creator. Therefore, God exists!  
The papal argument presupposes cosmic creation ex nihilo to be miraculous and yet 
at the same time it derives creation from a scientific theory based on the laws of 
nature. The theist cannot have it both ways. God transcends the laws of nature, 
which he created together with the universe, and the laws cannot act as a guide to 
how he created the universe. 
 The question of the relationship between big bang cosmology and divine 
creation has been discussed endlessly but without much coming out of the 
discussion.52 Just as the finite-age big bang universe offers no strong support for 
theism, so an infinitely old universe offers no strong support for atheism. The 
American astronomer Carl Sagan evidently thought that an eternal universe is 
incompatible with theism. Imagine that the pre-big bang model or some other past-
eternal model was proved correct. This, Sagan suggested, would be “the one 
conceivable finding of science that could disprove a Creator – because an infinitely 
old universe would never have been created.”53 However, to counter the argument 
the theist only has to appeal to the concept of continual creation discussed in the 
middle ages. Irrespective of its age there needs to be a cause that maintains the 
existence of the universe and this cause qualifies as a creation.  
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 Indeed, most theologians and Christian philosophers agree that creatio 
continua is more important than the original form of creation corresponding to a 
finite-age universe. As early as 1933 the British mathematician and bishop of 
Birmingham, Ernest William Barnes, pointed out that his God was not to be found in 
the origin of our universe: 
Men have thought to find God at the special creation of their own species, or active 
when mind or life first appeared on the earth. They have made him God of the gaps in 
human knowledge. To me the God of the trigger is as little satisfying as the God of the 
gaps. It is because throughout the physical Universe I find thought and plan and 
power that behind it I see God as creator.54 
During the controversy over steady state cosmology in the 1950s this theory, with its 
infinite time scale in both directions, was sometimes considered a challenge to 
theism. But as theologians were quick to point out, the claimed problem was nothing 
but a pseudo-problem; the question of whether the universe has a beginning or not, 
is of no real importance for theology. A later theologian expressed it in this way: 
“Divine creativity is not restricted to a finite stretch of time, or to the past, but is a 
continuing activity, as theologians from Augustine to Luther and Calvin to the 
present have argued. Creation is not just a matter of beginnings.”55 It is debatable 
whether this kind of response is satisfactory. Continual creation in the theological 
sense is metaphysical and without a counterpart in physical cosmology. Sceptics will 
argue that the appeal to creatio continua is nothing but a way of protecting the 
Christian creation doctrine from scientific criticism. If divine creation is simply based 
on the undeniable existence of the world it is impossible to argue against the 
doctrine. 
 There is no agreement between theologians, or between theologians and 
cosmologists, regarding the relationship between Christian belief and cosmological 
models. Most theologians deny a direct relation, such that the finite-age big bang 
universe lends support to the hypothesis of a divine creator or that an eternal 
universe disproves the hypothesis. But not all do. The Christian philosopher William 
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Craig sides with Pius XII when he claims that “the big bang model thus provided 
dramatic empirical verification of the biblical doctrine of creatio ex nihilo.”56  
 The question has been discussed for more than thousand years and one 
might perhaps expect that the recent progress in physical cosmology would have led 
to some clarification or even definite answers. But this has not been the case and it is 
unlikely that it will ever happen. Science is impotent with respect to theological 
doctrines and theology is of no direct relevance to science. Let me end this essay by 
quoting the balanced view from an introductory textbook in astronomy: 
If we use God as an explanation for the big bang, there would be no reason to look 
further for a natural explanation. Use of supernatural explanations would shut down 
science. … If science relied on a creator to explain the inexplicable, there would be 
nowhere to go, no way to prove that explanation wrong. The question would have 
already been settled. … Science does not deny the existence of God. God is simply 
outside its realm.57 
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